History, culture, and trade: a dynamic gravity approach by Campbell, Douglas L.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
History, culture, and trade: a dynamic
gravity approach
Douglas L. Campbell
UC Davis
July 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24014/
MPRA Paper No. 24014, posted 21. July 2010 18:04 UTC
1 
 
 
 
History, Culture, and Trade: A Dynamic Gravity Approach 
 
 
 
 
Douglas L. Campbell 
dolcampb@gmail.com 
UC Davis 
July 2010 
(Original Version: January 2008) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
What determines trade patterns? Habit persistence in consumer tastes and learning-by-doing in 
production imply that history and culture matter. Deriving a dynamic gravity equation from a 
simple model, it is shown that cultural similarity is a product of history, so that trade patterns are 
a function of bilateral GDP, current trade costs, and the past history of trade costs. Using a trade 
data set which spans from 1870 to 2000, it is shown that many gravity variables operate via 
lagged trade, that historical trade shocks matter, and that trade patterns are persistent, even across 
centuries. 
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What determines trade patterns? The gravity equation, hailed as one of the most empirically 
successful paradigms in economics, posits that bilateral trade flows are a function of GDP and 
current trade costs. This paper shows that general models of either habit persistence in consumer 
tastes or market-specific fixed costs (such as learning-by-doing) in production lead to a simple 
dynamic gravity equation in which trade patterns are a function of bilateral GDP, current trade 
costs, and the past history of trade costs. This equation can help explain various empirical 
conundrums of international trade, including why geography variables work just as well for 
services as they do for goods (Kimura and Lee, 2006), why typical empirical gravity variables 
such as former colonial status (Rose, 2000) and religion (Frattiani and Kang, 2006) are correlated 
with trade,1 why one-time trade shocks, such as Romalis (2006) documents for NAFTA or 
exchange-rate shocks as in Krugman (1987), take time to reach their full effect, and why trade 
patterns are persistent, even across centuries (this new empirical fact is documented in Table 1 
below). The model can also offer a partial explanation for why the significance of distance in the 
gravity equation has not decreased apace with declines in transport costs (see Table 2).   
Bilateral trade is remarkably persistent, as trade patterns in 1870 can predict some 21% 
of trade in 2000 (Table I), in the 26-country, 131-year trade database created by Jacks, Meissner, 
and Novy (2008). Neither the raw correlation of 46%, nor the significance of trade lagged 130 
years diminishes once the standard gravity controls, including contemporaneous GDP, are added, 
and similar results are attained for the post-war period with a much larger IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics (DOTS) database, displayed in Appendix Table 1. Bilateral trade in 1955 is a 
better predictor of trade in 2005 than is GDP. While various theories, including a Heckscher-
Ohlin, factor endowments-based theory, might imply that trade patterns should be persistent if 
factor endowments evolve slowly, the remarkable persistence of trade patterns – even across 
centuries – implies that a serious formal investigation of the role of history in trade is warranted, 
and that a dynamic gravity equation is preferred to a static equation.  
 
 
                                                 
1
 The possibility does exist that a partial explanation is that these are tariff correlates. In "Achieving Peace and 
Prosperity in the Greater Middle East", Ed Gresser documents that the US has higher tariffs on goods coming from 
Muslim countries, available at http://www.ppionline.org/. 
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Table 1: Dependent Variable, Log Trade 2000  
   Log Trade in:       1870       1890         1910         1928         1955         1969         1980         1995 
  
    Coefficient        0.328*     0.338*      0.445*      0.590*      0.822*      0.875*      0.974*       1.005* 
      Std. Error         (0.06)      (0.05)       (0.05)        (0.06)       (0.07)       (0.04)        (0.03)        (0.01) 
   Observations        130          142           147           148           146            149           149           149        
     R-Squared          0.21       0.255        0.321        0.376        0.515         0.768        0.911        0.984 
  Corr. w/ 2000:      0.46         0.56          0.59           0.65         0.73           0.89         0.96          0.99  
 * significant at 1%; 26 country sample from Jacks, Meissner, Novy (2008). 
 
If the consensus view among economists is correct, that trade is important for economic 
development, then the results in Table 1 imply that history is important for development as well. 
The seeming dependence of trade on lagged values also implies that one needs to be careful with 
panel data, as trade flows from one year (or century) to the next are highly correlated, meaning 
that the errors are not likely to be independent, as is often assumed. And the inclusion of 
country-pair fixed effects and year dummies does nothing to solve the independence issue.   
While there are several plausible reasons why the coefficient on the log of distance has 
not decreased apace with declines in transport costs, including regional biases in trade 
liberalization (think NAFTA, MERCOSUR, or the EU), and a movement from Heckscher-Ohlin-
type trade, heavy in commodities and resource-intensive goods based on factor endowments, 
toward a world where goods are finely differentiable and subject to increasing returns, the 
puzzling failure of the size and significance of distance to diminish is another motivation for 
reconsidering the interpretation that geographic variables merely proxy contemporaneous trade 
costs. Here, too, dynamic gravity provides a partial explanation, as the "past trade costs" term is 
usually changing only very slowly for most country pairs, but increasing for country-pairs such 
as Australia and the UK since colonization.2  
 
 
                                                 
2
 Since the "distance puzzle" was first noticed in postwar data by Levinsohn and Leamer (1995), much research has 
been done, including Jacks (2009), Carrère and Shiff (2005), and Berthelon and Freund (2008). The second new 
empirical fact documented in this paper is that the distance puzzle -- quite surprisingly -- goes back centuries.  
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Table 2: The Distance Puzzle Across Centuries  
Regression Type OLS OLS Between Between 
Time Period 1900 2000 1870-1914 1946-2000 
     Log Distance -1.353* -1.860* -1.601* -1.570* 
 
(0.26) (0.15) (0.26) (0.14) 
     Log Domestic GDP 1.298* 1.314* 1.301* 1.222* 
 
(0.15) (0.08) (0.16) (0.08) 
     Border Dummy 2.096** 1.334** 2.297** 1.287** 
 
(0.99) (0.55) (1.02) (0.54) 
     Island Dummy 2.973* 0.599** 3.100* 1.115* 
 
(0.52) (0.29) (0.53) (0.28) 
     Observations 144 149 6209 7896 
Number of pairid 144 149 148 149 
R-squared 0.514 0.741 0.526 0.701 
  Dependent Variable Log Trade. Standard errors in parentheses; 26 country sample from Jacks, 
  Meissner, Novy (2008). + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%.  
 
 
 A dynamic gravity equation can be derived from either a simple, micro-founded model of 
habit persistence in consumer tastes or by market-specific learning-by-doing in production. The 
key idea is that trade costs are one determinant of relative prices, and these relative prices 
determine production and consumption baskets, which are then persistent, owing to sunk costs 
and human nature. Hence, gravity variables such as distance and past colonial status are also 
proxies for "cultural differences" in addition to proxying contemporaneous trade costs, where 
cultural differences are defined simply by the taste and the learning-by-doing parameters.3 Habit 
                                                 
3
 The basic insight of Anthropology is that there are few, if any, cultural universals. Conversely, most economic 
models, interestingly, assume away any cultural differences. In any case, there are no universally agreed upon 
definitions for culture. My own Cultural Anthropology professor defined culture by sharing a story passed down 
from an old professor of his, who once surprised his party guests by suddenly informing them that the hamburgers 
they had been served were made with dog meat. Culture was then defined as that visceral gut reaction which caused 
the party guests to groan and spit out their food, as the western cultural taboo against eating dog is strictly learned 
(and shared). I shall take a culturally academic-Economist route and give culture a precise mathematical definition -- 
the CES taste parameters --  which does not preclude the possibility of cultural universals. 
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persistence and learning-by-doing imply that culture, and thus trade, is a function of the past 
history of all trade costs.   
 The idea of habit persistence and the time-nonseparability of preferences emanates from 
the growing literature on "endogenous preferences," including Bowles (1998), and on models of 
cultural formation, such as Rauch and Trindade (2004). This literature is supported by three key 
empirical micro studies, Naik and Moore (1996), Logan and Rhode (2008), and Atkin (2009) 
each of which finds empirical support for the proposition that past relative prices determine 
current tastes using data on food consumption.4 Habit persistence in aggregate consumption (a 
slightly different phenomenon) is also a common feature of models in macroeconomics, such as 
in Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000), and International Economics in models of the current 
account (Gruber 2004), with most studies finding significant empirical support.  
Learning-by-doing is likewise not a new concept, probably pre-dating John Stuart Mill 
(1848), who popularized infant industry protection. In their 1985 book synthesizing new trade 
theory with the old, Helpman and Krugman wrote: "In practice, it is likely that one of the most 
important sources of economies of scale (and of imperfect competition) lies in the dynamic 
process by which firms and industries improve their technologies." Although the authors did not 
explicitly include dynamic models in their book, they did suggest that "a major goal of further 
work will have to be to develop a truly dynamic trade theory."5 While Krugman (1987) and 
Krugman and Baldwin (1989), among others, followed up with dynamic models of learning-by-
doing, to date, neither models of habit persistence nor models of learning-by-doing have made an 
impact on the gravity literature. And while some researchers who work with gravity might try 
dynamic specifications, Eichengreen and Irwin (1998) being the most prominent, and may also 
                                                 
4
 Indeed, the idea of habit persistence goes back even further. In 415 B.C., Euripides wrote the play Trojan Women, 
in which Andromache says: "But if the choice is between a miserable life, mother, if it is between a miserable life 
and death, death is preferable. Because the dead feel no misery and they know nothing of grief, whereas for the 
living mortals, if a happy woman falls into misery she must deal with the memory of the joy she previously enjoyed. 
Her soul seeks the joys of the past." Although Andromache was speaking of persistence in the aggregate, if goods 
are imperfectly substitutable, this would translate to the type of persistence discussed in this paper. In more recent 
times, writer and psychologist Virginia Satir says that "The will to survive is not the strongest instinct in humans, 
the strongest instinct is to do what is familiar."  
5
  Helpman, Krugman, p. 38-39. 
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suspect that the geographic variables proxy cultural differences, this is rarely stated, and these 
dynamic specifications were never derived from any model, nor has there been any attempt 
among practitioners of gravity to model how these cultural differences might have arisen.6 This 
paper strives to help fill the gap. 
 An example of how the theory works in practice is that in 1704, the cost of rice in 
London was 25 times the price in Canton (Allen 2004), and today, China consumes 10 times as 
much rice as the US on a per capita basis.7 This cannot solely be due to the fact that China is 
poor and rice is a cheap necessary good (or perhaps even a giffen good for some rice farmers), as 
even Japan, where rice is vastly more expensive than in the US due to an import quota, consumes 
about four times as much rice as the US on a per capita basis.8 Hence, while part of the reason 
that the US has such a significant share of world rice exports (about 10-15%, although 
declining)9 is due to factor endowments -- California is a good place to grow rice -- and 
agricultural subsidies, another factor is that Americans do not demand as much rice as do East 
Asians, who consume relatively more rice due to the long history of relative prices which has 
embedded rice in their preferences -- which I label "culture".10   
                                                 
6
 Some other examples of dynamic versions of gravity used in practice without model-based theoretical justification 
are Cho, Kim, and Koo (2003), Martinez-Zarzoso, Nowak-Lehmann, and Horsewood (2009), Berger and Nitsch 
(2008), and de Nardis, De Santis, and Vicarelli (2009). 
7
    USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), Aug 2002, at 
http://www.foodmarketexchange.com/datacenter/product/grain/rice/detail/dc_pi_gr_rice0802_01.htm. The UK 
consumes even less per capita than does the US.  
8
     Ibid. 
9
 Childs, Nathan and Burdett, Amy, "The US Rice Export Market", USDA Special Article, 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/Rice/SpecialArticle/USricemarket.pdf. 
10
   Another example of this came to me while I was presenting an earlier draft of this paper at a conference in 
Guanajuato, Mexico, when I asked my homestay mother why she did not drink or serve wine, like my home-stay 
family in Spain did. She replied, "Aqui en Mexico, nosotros bebemos coca!" ("Here in Mexico, we drink Coca-
Cola!") This is likely due to the long history of relative prices, as wine production was forbidden in Mexico in 
colonial times, as Mexico was forced to import wine, expensively, from Spain. Indeed, Miguel Hidalgo first got into 
trouble with the authorities was when he taught peasants to grow vines, which was illegalized by the peninsulare 
authorities (see Fehrenbach's Fire and Blood: A History of Mexico). On the other hand, Mexico and the US share a 
7 
  Consider that Japan imports some 25 billion disposable chopsticks annually from China, 
and not just because the close distance makes it economical and China is endowed with 
relatively more cheap labor, and forests filled with tropical timber unmolested by environmental 
protections, but also because Japanese people are culturally preconditioned to eat with chopsticks 
instead of forks and spoons.11 This is a cultural influence that developed due to the close 
proximity of China and Japan historically, and due to the cultural pull – very much like the pull 
of gravity – of China.  
The chopsticks trade is not explained solely by persistent tastes, however, as making 
chopsticks, similar to Adam Smith’s pin factory, is subject to learning-by-doing. Since Chinese 
have been using chopsticks for centuries, it is plausible that they might have a learning-by-doing 
advantage over a potential South Asian, African, or South American entrant into the lucrative 
Japanese waribashi (throw-away chopsticks) market. Hence, once Japan had industrialized, 
countries near Japan with a similar, shared culture, such as South Korea and Taiwan, where a 
significant number of people even speak Japanese due to colonization, had an advantage in 
development – and hence this model of trade is also a model of economic growth. If history 
matters for trade, it must also matter for development.  
The modest goal of this paper is to write down a simple model with tastes determined by 
habit persistence (section I) and learning-by-doing in production (section II), to derive a gravity 
equation from each (they are combined in the Unpublished Appendix), to introduce a new 
method of estimating gravity equations based on the theory, and to show that the implications of 
a general version of such a model have significant explanatory power for the evolution of trade,  
even across centuries (section III). Section IV concludes by highlighting some possibilities for 
future work.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
border and relatively low trade costs, which may explain why American products such as Coca-Cola have become 
so embedded into the identity of Mexicans.  
11
   Mildly interesting articles on chopsticks production can be found here: 
http://homepage.mac.com/mstrauch/greenchopsticks/read05bidne.html. Occasional Canadian and US producers 
have entered the market hoping to capitalize on North America's large endowment of timber, but apparently without 
success. 
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I. A Model of Habit-Persistence in Consumer Tastes 
 
This section introduces a simple model in which trade flows are determined by tastes, and tastes 
evolve via habit persistence, leading to a "dynamic" gravity equation in which trade flows are a 
function of the past history of all trade costs.  
 In the tradition of Anderson (1979), and following Feenstra (2004), Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) and Novy (2008), I assume that a representative consumer in country (or 
region) j maximizes utility given by:  
(1.1) 
                                                     
   
1 1 1
1
, 1
C
ij ij
i
c
σ
σ σ σ
σ σ σβ
 
      
   
   
− − −
=
 
  >
 
 
∑  
The units of consumption, ijc  denote all varieties of goods produced in country i and 
consumed in country j. One key difference between this and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) 
and Novy (2008) is that the taste parameters ijβ  vary between countries, a specification also used 
by Combes et. al. (2005). These taste parameters are how I shall incorporate history into the 
model. Each country is subject to a budget constraint 
1
j
C
ij ij
i
Y p c
=
=∑   (1.2), where ijp  is the price 
of a good produced in country i and sold in country j. Maximizing (1.1) subject to (1.2), and 
using the definition of exports ij ij ijx p c=  and Samuelson (1952) iceberg transport costs, so that
p pij i ijτ= , leads to:  
(1.3)                                                     ( )
1
j i ij ij
j
ij
Y p
P
x
σ
τ β −
=
     
 
Where 1( )j i ij ij
i
P p στ β −=∑ .  Now, if we normalize the within country trade cost terms to one, 
i.e., 1iiτ =  (which is not necessary, but which simplifies things), and assume symmetry of trade 
costs, then, using the method from Novy (2008), we can arrive at a clean expression for bilateral 
trade:  
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(1.4)                                             ( )
1
2(1 )ij ji
ji
ii jj
ii jjij ji x xx x
σ
σβ β
τβ β
−
−
 
  
 
=
    
 
Hence, bilateral trade is a function of the taste parameters (the betas), trade costs, and the size of 
both countries’ domestic trade. Linder's (1961) hypothesis was that countries which have similar 
demand structures should trade more with each other, so that one obvious extension of this 
model would be to make the betas a function of per capita income or the difference in per capita 
income, both familiar gravity controls (Bergstrand 1989, did something similar). And, indeed, if 
ij iiβ β= and ji jjβ β= , the first term in equation (1.4) cancels. More empirically relevant is the 
case of home-bias, where ij iiβ β>  and ji jjβ β>  (remembering that with 1σ > , (1 ) /σ σβ − has a 
negative exponent).  
Eaton and Kortum (2002) capture how geography matters for trade, writing that 
“geographic barriers reflect such myriad impediments as transport costs, tariffs and quotas, 
delay, and problems with negotiating a deal from afar,” to which this paper adds differences in 
tastes and culture. The evolution of tastes is not merely a random walk, although it is certainly 
plausible that a substantial component is random. I shall posit that a given region's tastes are 
persistent, so that the taste parameters today are a function of past consumption.  
 There are various reasons why tastes might be persistent at the micro level. First is the 
role that addiction plays for goods such as caffeine, nicotine, and alcohol. Yet aside from these 
more obviously chemically-addicting goods, a wide variety of other goods and activities are 
naturally habit forming. A second motivation is “experience goods” – goods which one needs 
first to consume to gauge the quality. Thirdly, past consumption can reduce the future search 
costs of finding out when, where, and how to consume a good in the future (Rauch 1999 and 
Rauch and Trindade 2002 highlight the importance and implications of search for trade). And, 
due to these search and also negotiating costs, the optimal contract length for some industries 
might be longer than the time interval for many trade datasets, which is typically one year. 
Fourth, replacement component parts – such as cell phone rechargers – must be compatible with 
the original product, meaning that one's past consumption habits can lock in future consumption. 
A fifth motivation is that some goods take time to learn how to use, and once the fixed cost of 
learning how to use a good has been paid, it may be rational to be biased in favor of consuming 
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that good again in the future versus other goods which have yet to be learned. Sixth, network 
externalities can also make changing consumption of a particular good difficult, as collective 
choice is often not possible (Rauch and Trindade, 2002, discuss network externalities for social 
goods). These six motivations are by no means exhaustive. 
 I shall assume the following functional form, which is qualitatively similar to that found 
in the macro literature: 1
( 1)ijt ij tc
σ ρβ −
−
≡ , where ρ  is less than unity, and where the subscript t 
denotes the time-period in question.12 Plugging in the above, iterating, and taking logs yields a 
simple, tractable, dynamic gravity equation (see appendix for derivation).   
 
(1.5)                         ( )1
) )ln ln( 2(1 )ln 2 ln(
CurrentTradeCosts
PastTradeCosts
jit ji t k
k
k
iitijt jit jjtxx x x σ τ ρ σ τ
∞
−
=
+ − −= ∑
1442443
144424443
     
 
 This expression is intuitively straightforward – trade today depends on the size of each 
country’s home market, current trade costs, and past trade costs, as current tastes are simply a 
function of all past trade costs. Hence, had trade costs been zero for all time, the theory predicts 
that the size of trade between regions i and j should be just as large as the trade within region i 
and within region j. If, on the other hand, two cultures have a long history of separation, then the 
theory says that there will be less trade.   
 If the static gravity equation for trade is analogous to the physics equation for the force 
between objects due to gravity, then the analogue to equation (1.5) is the equation for velocity 
due to gravity, which would be a function of both initial velocity and the current force due to 
gravity. Initial velocity, in turn, would be a function of the forces and gravitational distances 
which have acted in the past, just as habits are a function of past relative prices. In its reduced 
form, "dynamic gravity" -- both in the thermodynamics version as well as the economics version 
-- should be a function of five dimensions: space, time and mass.13   
                                                 
12
 For example, in Carroll, Overland, and Weil (2000), , ℎ = 
	

/ℎ	
, where c is consumption, h is the 
stock of habit persistence, which evolves according to a weighted average of past consumption (rather than just the 
previous period's consumption as in my specification), and  indexes the importance of habits. In their model, this 
leads to agents in fast-growing countries (such as the Asian Tigers) to want to smooth their consumption growth.  
13
 Later in the paper elevation is included in a gravity regression as the third spatial dimension.  
11 
 How sensitive is equation (1.5) to the assumptions? First note that if we were to change 
the functional form of habit persistence to 1
( 1)ijt ij ts
σ ρβ −
−
≡ where /ij ij ij js p c Y= , there would be no 
change in equation (1.5) due to cancellations. While equation (1.5) will certainly not hold for all 
general functional forms, many other plausible functional forms clearly would carry the same 
implications, likely with more complication. It is also not realistic to imagine that past 
consumption is the only determinant of the taste parameters, but rather, one factor among many. 
Random shocks could easily be added to the model, but would not alter the basic intuition.  
 And if we were to include the reasonable assumption that agents know that their 
consumption today will affect their tastes tomorrow (generating an Euler equation from the 
consumer maximization problem), the major difference with the above would be that bilateral 
trade would now be a function of both past and future trade costs. At the same time, it is less 
reasonable to assume that agents know the future history of all trade costs and prices, and there is 
considerable evidence that agents are myopic, and are often caught by surprise by habit 
persistence in goods such as cigarettes, or else they would presumably not smoke the first one. 
Since the implications of such a model are similar to equation (1.5), this extension of the model 
is left to the unpublished version of the appendix.  
 Interestingly, none of the six motivations for habit persistence listed above are 
necessarily independent of the actions of producers, as firms invest heavily in designing food and 
drugs to be addictive. Firms can also reduce uncertainty over product quality by either giving 
new products away at first (viz., Red Bull and Coke Zero were both initially distributed free at 
universities, and the Wall Street Journal is free for many university students, with the hope that 
these products will become embedded in students' utility functions once they have graduated and 
their ability to pay increases), or via marketing, which can also alleviate search costs for 
consumers, and make strange new products seem more familiar. Smart firms will also make 
expensive component parts which are not compatible with products of other firms or past 
versions of the same product, such as cell phone rechargers.  
 Below I shall show that counting these as firms' productivity parameters will lead to 
precisely the same formulation of dynamic gravity as in equation (1.5) above. This paper argues, 
in effect, that there is a far greater duality between firm-level market-specific productivity 
parameters and consumer preferences than has been acknowledged, and that the two, in fact, are 
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indistinguishable even at a conceptual level (something akin to the Heisenberg Uncertainty 
Principle, to keep the physics analogy alive, as we cannot simultaneously measure both). This is 
due in part to the fact that, for many firms, including, famously, the pharmaceutical industry 
(Naik et. al. 2009), marketing, distribution, and sales costs dwarf that of actual production or 
R&D costs. That is, the most important "productivity" parameter for a firm such as Coca-cola 
(whose actual production costs are a bit more than one-third of its revenues)14 may have nothing 
to do with physical production itself, but rather with the strength of Coca-cola's name-brand, 
consumers' familiarity (or addiction) to the product, and the firm's distribution network.  
 
II. Learning-By-Doing in Production 
 
 First, assume that each country j maximizes revenue: 
1
C
ji ji
i
p q
=
∑ , where, analogous to the 
Armington assumption,15 I assume that what country j sends to country i is different than what it 
sends to country k or what it consumes at home) subject to the CES output function (also called a 
constant elasticity of transformation, or CET function). 
(2.1)                                               
1 1
1
, 0
C
j ji ji
i
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ω
ω ω
ω ωα
 
    
 
 
+ +
=
 
 ≥ >
 
 
∑     
This functional form is motivated by Feenstra's (2007) Zeuthen lectures and Feenstra 
(2010) and is similar to Bergstrand (1985) and Baier and Bergstrand (1991). Feenstra and Kee 
(2008) show that this specification is implied by a monopolistic competition model with 
heterogenous firms and a Pareto distribution for endogenous productivity, as is the case in  
popular papers such as Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), and Chaney (2005).  
Maximizing revenue subject to (2.1), and using the definition of exports ji ji jix p q=  and 
Samuelson (1952) iceberg transport costs, so that 1ji i jip p τ −= , unilateral exports are:   
                                                 
14
 From Coca-Cola's Income Statement, available at: http://www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/investors/financial_statements.html. 
15
 The Armington assumption is that goods produced in different countries are imperfect substitutes, here I assume 
that goods produced in one location bound for different markets are different.   
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(2.2)                                                         
1
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ω
ωω ωτ α
++
− −
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=  
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Ρ ∑ . If within-country trade costs are normalized to unity and 
trade costs are symmetric, then we can derive another simple gravity equation using the same 
method as before.   
(2.3)                                                ( ) 2(1 )ii jj ji
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ωα α
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α α
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Hence, bilateral trade is a function of the market-specific productivity parameters, trade 
costs, and the size of both countries’ home markets. (One extension would be to make the 
productivity parameters a function of endowments in the spirit of Heckscher-Ohlin.) The idea 
being that there are substantial fixed costs and learning-by-doing associated both with 
developing products and with entering specific markets, and so it is easier for a producer to sell 
to a market which has similar “learning-by-doing” requirements, perhaps due to low transport 
costs historically.16  
To fix ideas, consider Diagram 1 below, where, with no trade, region 1 would be forced 
to produce just for the home market, at point A. If region 1 opens to trade, and if the home and 
foreign markets are exactly the same, you maximize your own GDP by producing an equal 
amount for home and abroad at point B. If, however, regions 1 and 2 are dissimilar, then region 1 
will produce much more for the home market, as in Diagram 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 For an interesting reminder of the fixed costs of entering regional markets, see the following fascinating video on 
the growth of Wal-Mart stores: http://projects.flowingdata.com/walmart/. Wal-Mart's strategy is to enter a market, 
and then saturate it before moving to the next closest region.  
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 Since 
11q
11q  is the production of all varieties of goods for the home market, then, as in the 
ubiquitous Melitz (2003) model, a country could increase total productivity by concentrating on 
producing (and exporting) fewer varieties, thus incurring fewer fixed costs. If the fixed costs for 
entering a new market were less than the fixed costs for creating generic versions of the product, 
then 0ω >  is plausible. In the Melitz model, when a country opens up to trade, the marginally 
productive firms go out of business, and their resources are shifted to more productive uses. For 
example, in autarky, Japan might produce cars and movies. As both industries have substantial 
fixed costs, the value of total production would be higher if it focused on cars and imported its 
movies from Hollywood.  
As before, however, the technology parameters are not merely exogenously given, but 
rather, they reflect learning-by-doing and sunk costs. These include building factories, designing 
products, acquiring patents and copyrights, and creating distribution chains, sales networks, and 
brand names through marketing, all of which require detailed knowledge about local markets, 
tastes, customs, languages, and regulations. Once acquired, these are assets that will continue to 
make the firm more productive in the future.  
Mirroring the motivations for habit persistence on the consumer side, a successful sale 
one period will naturally yield to the seller information about where, when, how and to whom to 
make a successful sale in the future (as for the consumer), and could potentially increase the 
possibility of future sales via "reputation effects". In addition, many products are sold in 
complementary fashion (an Epsilon printer needs Epsilon ink), meaning that a sale one period 
15 
can lock in sales in future periods as well. And although it seems more natural to model the 
effects of addiction or product learning-by-doing on the consumer side, the addiction of 
consumers to a product could conceivably reduce marketing and distribution costs for firms, an 
effect which is just as plausibly modeled from a producer's standpoint. Hence, as attempts to 
disentangle which effect is greater -- habit persistence in consumer tastes or market-specific 
learning-by-doing -- is unlikely to be a useful line of enquiry.17  
I posit that the productivity parameters are a function of the past selling history: 
( 1)ijt ij tq
ω ρα −
−
≡  (where ρ is less than unity). Plugging this in above, iterating, and taking logs 
yields a dynamic gravity equation similar to equation (1.5).  
 
(2.4)                        ( )1
) )ln ln( 2(1 ) ln ln(
CurrentTradeCosts
PastTradeCosts
jit ji t k
k
k
iitijt jit jjtxx x x ω τ ρ ω τ
∞
−
=
− + −= ∑
1442443
1442443       
 
 This equation implies that any deviation from the frictionless situation where countries 
produce and consume a fixed amount of each other’s products must be a result of either trade 
costs today, or past trade costs. An extension of this model in which firms know what future 
costs will look like, and realize that today's sales will affect their future productivity, would carry 
the additional implication that future trade costs and future market size also matter. Hence, if 
firms know today that China is likely to be a big, rich market in the future, they might devote 
resources to entering the Chinese market and establishing a brand name, even though it would 
not be maximizing revenues at present.  
Equation (2.4) is the logical gravity formulation of market-specific learning-by-doing in 
production, and something similar is implied by the Melitz (2003) model in addition to a host of 
other models which include market-specific fixed costs of entry, including the Krugman (1980) 
                                                 
17
 For example, Toyota has a strong brand name in the United States, much stronger than, say, Shanghai 
Automotive. We could model this from the consumer side, as American consumers would no doubt prefer to buy a 
car from Toyota than from Shanghai Automotive, all else equal, or we could model this from the producer side, 
treating the strength of Toyota's brand name in the US as a productive asset. Either way we choose to model it, we 
would be talking about exactly the same phenomenon.  
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"home market effect" model, as well as "dynamic returns" and "learning-by-doing" models such 
as Krugman (1987) and Krugman and Baldwin (1989).   
 
III. Empirics 
 
 The point of building a general model featuring habit persistence and learning-by-doing 
is to show that trade patterns are not only determined by current trade costs, but also by “culture” 
– which in this context means both relative tastes and the accumulated store of market-specific 
learning-by-doing.  
 The hypothesis is that trade depends on three factors: the domestic trade shares in each 
country, current trade costs, and past trade costs. Most of the variables used to proxy current 
trade costs -- particularly the geographic variables -- also happen to proxy past trade costs. The 
heart of the evidence for the model was also the motivation, for this model explains why past 
colonial status and other typical gravity variables seem to matter so much for trade (past colonial 
status implies lower historical trade costs), why the gravity equation explains trade in services as 
well as in goods (the geographic variables proxy culture in addition to shipping costs), and it can 
explain why one-time changes in trade costs take time to reach maximal impact. The model also 
provides another rationale for the existence of a "home market effect", as in Krugman (1980), 
Feenstra et. al. (1998) and Hanson and Xiang (2004), and is consistent with the findings of 
Bergin and Lin (2008), that the gravity variables work predominantly through the extensive 
margin of trade.  
 The theory is also supported by the array of evidence offered in Eichengreen and Irwin 
(1998), and by the aforementioned recent micro studies which show that food consumption is a 
function of past relative prices -- Logan and Rhode (2009) and Atkin (2009). And the fact that 
many firms do give away new products also lends support to the habit persistence thesis.18 The 
                                                 
18
 There is also ample evidence from other disciplines, such as political science, where it has been shown with 
randomized trials that voting may be habit forming (Gerber, Green, and Shachar, 2003). There also seems to be 
habit persistence in party identification, with Presidential elections determining party identification for the youth in 
each generation, with persistence lasting decades. Those who came of age during the Great Depression and the 
Kennedy or Clinton years tend to be Democrats, those during the Eisenhower or Reagan years are still more likely 
identify as Republicans:  http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2009/05/bush-may-haunt-republicans-for.html. 
17 
trade behavior of countries after terms-of-trade shocks, in which the Marshall-Lerner condition 
tends to be satisfied in the long run but not the short (see Magee, 1973, on the J-curve), also 
support the theory.19  
 On the producer side, a fascinating recent empirical micro study on by Hirakawa, 
Muendler, and Rauch (2009) provides evidence for market-specific learning-by-doing in Brazil, 
and the aforementioned video on the growth of Wal-mart is a reminder that there must be clear 
market-specific fixed costs of entry. Two recent studies illustrate the intuitive concept that one-
time changes in trade costs can have persistent effects. Feyrer (2009) documents that for country 
pairs affected by the closing of the Suez canal, the maximal impact was reached seven years after 
the closing, after which time it was then re-opened. Nine years after the reopening, trade was still 
increasing.20 Berger and Nitsch (2008) find strong evidence that the result of European 
integration and the adoption of the Euro was a long-term, gradual increase in trade intensity. And 
Romalis (2004) similarly documents for NAFTA that even for commodities, trade liberalization 
takes years to reach its full effect. The rest of this section further strengthens the evidence. 
 
III.A. Evidence from Warfare-Induced Trade Shocks 
 
 One classic example from economic history is the US Civil War, when Egypt, Brazil and 
India appropriated the British cotton market (Ellison 1968).21 Even ten years into the post-war 
Reconstruction, cotton production in these three countries was still thrice the pre-Civil War level, 
as these countries had devoted more resources to cotton production, developed higher-yielding 
varieties and established relationships and distribution networks facilitating exports to Britain.   
                                                 
19
 There is, of course, a vast literature on the J-curve, with Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) providing support 
and with Bahmani-Oskooee (2004) supplying a nice overview. Yet, even if not all research suggests that the 
Marshall Lerner condition -- that the sum of the export and import elasticity must be greater than one for a 
devaluation to improve the trade balance -- is satisfied in the long term but not the short, then most research at least 
appears to support that the Marshall-Lerner conditions are more satisfied in the long-term than the short. It should be 
noted that J-curve research is made especially difficult by the problem of endogeneity, as countries do not devalue 
their currencies randomly.  
20
 Feyrer authored a Voxeu column on this topic in 2009: http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/4428.  
21
 Cited in Wright (1974) and p. 381 of Atack and Passell (1994).  It should be noted that famines in India and 
booming American production restored US market share temporarily in the late 1870s.  
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 A second example is the history of US versus UK exports to Latin America before and 
after WWI, as analyzed by Taylor and Glick (2005) and Eichengreen and Irwin (1998). Up until 
the war restricted financial flows and trade, London dominated New York as a financial center 
and British exporters of manufactures dominated their American counterparts in world markets. 
With British commerce halted during the war, New York took over London's role as the place to 
float debentures while American manufacturers appropriated the Latin American market. Total 
US manufacturing exports increased fivefold during the war.22 Tafunell (2009) documents that 
American supremacy in machinery exports to Latin American was never again challenged, as her 
market share of machinery exports to Latin America were 28.6 percentage points higher in 1925 
than it had been in 1913, while the market shares for Great Britain and Germany declined by 39  
and 12 percentage points.23 During the war American manufacturers added capacity, set up 
supply chains and distribution networks, and familiarized Latin American customers with their 
products, so that even after the war, British exporters found it difficult to dislodge the 
Americans, and the UK never again regained its place as the leading exporter to the Americas.24 
Cochrane (2009) documents much the same story in the decline of London and the concomitant 
rise of New York as a financial center after 1913.25  
 In the graph below on the left, one can see that the UK's total exports to Mexico, 
Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil were about 30% larger than the US's; after the war, the roles were 
reversed.26 What has received less attention is that the very same pattern holds in Asia, and even 
                                                 
22
 This particular statistic comes from Day (1925), p. 373. 
23
 Thus American market share roughly doubled. Statistics from p. 932 of Tafunell (2009).  
24
 Indeed, thoughts of a war erupting over trade issues were thought to be enough of a possibility that both the US 
and the UK developed war plans in this period. The Washington Post.   
25
 This might be somewhat of an atypical example, as New York likely would have overtaken London eventually as 
the center of the financial world, but WWI just sped up the process. The same could be said for the US vs. the UK as 
exporters to Asia and Latin America as well, that WWI just sped up what might have happened eventually anyway, 
but it is impossible to know the counterfactual.  
26
 The same trend holds for each of these countries individually, which can be seen in the Appendix below in the 
case of Brazil, comparing US vs. UK vs. French exports, in which it can be seen that British exports to Brazil were 
nearly double the US's before the war, but roughly identical or less after the war, and that French exports were less 
after the war than before.  
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with British trade with its own colonial possessions. In the graph on the right, of US vs. UK 
exports to Japan and Indonesia, it can be seen that before 1914, British exports were twice 
American exports, but after the war, the roles were reversed.27 
 
 
  
 Another interesting test related to World War I is to ascertain what became of the US-
bound exports of countries in several categories -- those countries which fought in the war, such 
as the UK and Italy, those countries which were neutral, but which had their trade impugned by 
German U-boats, such as Norway, and finally, those countries whose US exports were largely 
unaffected, such as Japan. The results are exactly as theory would predict. Japan began the 
period exporting the least to the US as a percentage of GDP, but with US-European trade 
severely cut off, especially after 1918, Japanese exports became increasingly important, so that 
after the war, Japanese exports as a percentage of its own GDP were substantially higher than 
they had been previously. Neither UK nor Italian exports (as a share of GDP) recovered to pre-
war levels. While Norwegian exports did return to their pre-war level as a percentage of 
Norwegian GDP, this can hardly be considered an impressive feat given that US GDP had 
increased by about 70% by the end of the 1920s from the prewar period.   
                                                 
27
 The same trends hold for exports as a share of GDP, as before the war, the UK exported more than three times as 
much to Latin America, but after the war the UK exported less than twice as much to Latin America as a share of 
GDP. This graph can be found in the unpublished portion of the Appendix. 
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 Confirming the intuition gained in the graphs above, and the results in Glick and Taylor 
(2005), below I report the results from a gravity regression with both year and country-pair fixed 
effects, using dummies for each category of country-pair experiences during WWI. For example, 
in the first column are the dummies for non-European country pairs, such as Japan and the 
United States.28 In 1920, the coefficient of 1.937 tells us that trade was nearly six times what 
trade was with the baseline group, in this case non-European trade with European non-combatant 
countries, compared to what it had been in the pre-war period. (Indeed, in the graph above, it can 
be seen that Japanese-American trade was about five times its pre-war level, even as a fraction of 
Japanese GDP, while Italian exports to the US fell). This coefficient then declined in 1921 and 
1922, before leveling out. Since trade with many European countries declined dramatically 
during WWI, trade among non-European countries swelled, and after the war ended, this 
increase in trade persisted. Being true to the philosophy, I have included separate group dummies 
for each year, so that the sample size is not artificially inflated. The second column contains 
dummies for European countries which fought in WWI, such as France and Germany. Not 
                                                 
28
 The non-European group includes 13 countries, including Japan, Sri Lanka, Australia, New Zealand, the United 
States, Canada, Mexico, Uruguay, the Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, India, and Indonesia. The European WWI 
combatant group includes the UK, Belgium, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Denmark, Spain, 
Portugal, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands were classified as neutral.  
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surprisingly, trade in the 1920s was dramatically lower for countries in this category, although it 
did recover somewhat by 1925. Trade between European countries, such as France, and non-
European countries, such as India, was also dramatically hurt by the war but had recovered 
somewhat by 1925.  
 
Table 3: The Effects of WWI on Trade 
Dependent Variable Log Bilateral Trade; Log Domestic GDP & Year Dummies Suppressed 
Dummies for  Both Not   Both European, One European and  
Country Pairs European   Fought in WWI in WWI, one Not 
with:      European 
1920 1.937*   -2.664* -2.247* 
(0.25)   (0.33) (0.19) 
1921 1.564*   -2.218* -1.948* 
(0.25)   (0.33) (0.19) 
1922 1.206*   -1.932* -1.365* 
(0.25)   (0.33) (0.19) 
1923 1.392*   -2.098* -1.456* 
(0.25)   (0.33) (0.19) 
1924 1.285*   -1.973* -1.425* 
(0.25)   (0.33) (0.19) 
1925 1.475*   -1.774* -1.423* 
(0.25)   (0.33) (0.19) 
        
26-Country Sample from Meissner, Jacks, Novy (2008); Includes Country-Pair and Year Fixed Effects. 
Domestic GDP term suppressed. The sample includes 3789 observations and 149 country-pairs.  
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  III.B. Estimating a "Dynamic" Gravity Equation with Two-Way Regional Clusters 
 
If, instead of iterating ad-infinum in equation (3.4), we leave lagged trade in the equation 
(and simplify the parameters), and add an error term, we would get:    
 
(3.1)            ( ) ( )( )
1 ( ) ( )
) ) ln lnln ln( ln( s ij t s ji t sk sji t k ijt
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−
=
− −
+ ++ += ∑   
There are two key implications of the dynamic gravity theory for estimation. The first is 
that the errors from one year to the next will be very correlated, and that this will be true even if 
the last term in equation (3.1) is included or not, as the middle term, "past trade costs", evolves 
slowly and is unknown, although it is straightforward to proxy. Hence, I begin estimating gravity 
using a cross-section instead of as a panel to avoid the problem of correlated standard errors from 
one year to the next completely. The second, and perhaps more subtle point, is that if we know 
the trade flows between Sweden and Kenya, then the trade flows between Sweden and Tanzania 
will provide us somewhat less than completely new information (and the same may be true of 
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trade flows between Norway and Tanzania). This is because the "past trade costs" between 
Sweden-Kenya and Sweden-Tanzanian trade are likely to be similar, but not known exactly, and 
hence will show up in the errors, which will then be correlated. For example, the disease 
environment in Africa made trade with Europe more costly historically, and since the disease 
environments in Kenya and Tanzania were similar, the errors will then be correlated. Another 
example is that the EU eliminated tariffs on most goods coming from Sub-Saharan African in 
2001, but unless perfect tariff data is included as a regressor, this means that the errors will be 
potentially be correlated for all Europe-Africa country pairs.  
To solve this issue, I have experimented with various methods of clustering, and have 
invented what I term "Regional Two-Way Clusters," adapted from Cameron et. al. (2006), which 
is a procedure for clustering along multiple dimensions. The Regional Two-Way Cluster defines 
a cluster in the first direction as the first country in the dyadic pair's trade with 11 different 
regions of the world, and the second clustering dimension does the same for the second country 
in each dyadic pair. For example, the Sweden-Tanzania and Sweden-Kenya observations will 
both be in one cluster, and the Sweden-Denmark and Sweden-Norway observations are in 
another. This estimator allows the errors within any cluster to be positively correlated, and only 
requires the much weaker, and much more general assumption that the errors between different 
clusters are independent -- i.e., the errors for the Sweden-Africa cluster need to be independent 
of the Sweden-Europe cluster (in fact, the results presented in the appendix imply that there is 
negative correlation, which suggests that Regional Two-Way Clusters should be used). In 
generic two-way clusters, as used for gravity estimation in Cameron and Golotvina (2005), 
Swedish trade with all other countries when Sweden is the first country in the pairing would 
make only one cluster instead of 11. The problem with this is that if Sweden trades more with 
Europe, this will likely mean it might trade less with East Asia, in which case the standard errors 
will be downward biased.  
The "Regional Two-Way Cluster" variance estimator proposed has the form (from 
Cameron et. al., 2006):   
 
(3.2)            
 
1 1
ˆˆ
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Where the term rIS is an  ×  indicator matrix with  entry equal to one if the  
and  observation belong to the same regional cluster  ∈ 1,2, … ,11, and r rI JS ∩ has  entry 
equal to one only if the  and  observation belong to the same regional cluster   ∈
1,2, … ,11 and the same regional cluster   ∈ 1,2, … ,11. The u's are  × 1 vectors stacked by 
cluster, with  =  − X . 
For the results listed below in Table 4, I have used 11 regional clusters, while in the 
Appendix I have also reported what the standard errors would be for using 8 and 13 regional 
clusters, both one-way and two-way, and in the Unpublished Appendix I have also reported 
results for 20 regional clusters. (Given a 72 country sample, there would be little sense in doing 
more clusters than that.) I have reported results using 11 two-way regional clusters because the 
11 region cluster had the highest standard errors, and hence was the most conservative estimation 
method -- so conservative, in fact, that it killed the significance of several normal gravity 
variables, such as the log of area and an Africa dummy. 
The "One-Way Regional Clusters", reported in the appendix is just a simple cluster in 
which each regional pairing, i.e., North American trade with Europe, is one cluster. With 11 
Regions, this makes 72 clusters. This is the clustering you would want to use if you thought that 
the correlation in errors between, say, the Sweden-Tanzania and Norway-Kenya pairs is the most 
important thing to control for. Yet, in general, the standard errors on one-way clustering are not 
that different from two-way, but since they are frequently smaller, I report the two-way SEs for 
the main result in the interest of being conservative.29  
Even under this conservative methodology, the paramount importance of both geography 
and history for trade is readily apparent in Table 4 below. In the first column, it can be seen that, 
even in 2000, country-pairs which had ever had a colonial relationship traded about five times as 
much as those which did not. Secondly, various geographic variables are highly significant, even 
when reporting "Two-Way Regional Cluster" errors which tend to be 2-5 times larger than 
normal White Robust standard errors. Included are geographic variables such as the log of mean 
                                                 
29
 Heartbreakingly, clustering killed the statistical significance of the "cricket dummy" which I had planned on using 
as a cultural proxy, as countries which the UK had colonized for longer periods of time tend to play cricket and still 
trade more with each other than they do with other UK colonies, only the difference is not statistically significant.  
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elevation, the percentage of each country within 100 kilometers of coasts, and population-
weighted distance, which I have found works better than either distance between capitals or 
distance between geographic centers.30 Thirdly, the "Linder effect" is large and significant -- 
countries which have similar real GDP per capita trade more, as do countries which have higher 
GDP per capita, perhaps because they have better transport infrastructure and institutions which 
support or promote international trade. The relevance of the Linder term is also support for the 
model, as Linder's (1961) theory was dynamic in nature -- countries with similar incomes 
demand similar goods, and thus learn to produce similar goods. Indeed, if we were to include the 
Linder term, the log of absolute difference in per capita GDP lagged 40 years instead of 
concurrently, it would also be highly significant and have a similar magnitude. 
The regressions in Table 4 also include a variable, log migration, from Putterman and 
Weil's (2008) historical migration dataset, which details the historic origins, circa 1500, of 
populations in 2000. For example, in 2000, 18.28% of Americans' ancestors lived in the UK in 
1500. I have then inserted the log of the sum of the two way bilateral migration flows into the 
gravity equation, adding one to avoid the log of zero (and have tried other specifications as well), 
finding that increased migration between two countries is correlated with higher trade flows, 
although the effect is only significant at 90% (the regional geographic clusters increased the 
standard errors vs. OLS significantly). When the British migrated to Australia, they brought their 
tastes with them and continued to trade heavily with Britain despite the dramatically increased 
distance, in part because Britain had free trade throughout the empire. The correlation between 
immigration and trade has also been found in numerous less-comprehensive studies of immigrant 
networks including Rauch and Trindade (2002) for Chinese immigrant networks, Mundra (2005 
and 2009), Gould (1994) for immigrant groups in the US, Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) for 
historical US data, Herander and Saavedra (2005) for US states, White (2007) for the 
Netherlands, Head and Reis (1998) for Canada and Peri and Requena (2010) for Spain. To my 
knowledge this study uses more data than any previous work.   
                                                 
30
  In the unpublished version of the appendix, I compare four different measures of "distance" for gravity 
estimation, and find that simple population-weighted distance works the best compared with geographic center, 
distance between capitals, or CES population-weighted distance.  
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The really interesting finding in Table 4, however, is that when we control for trade 
lagged 40 years, which itself is large and significant, the impact of variables such as former 
colonial status, the island dummy, the log of population-weighted distance, the bilateral sum of 
the percentage of each country's population within 100km of a sea-navigable coast, log mean 
elevation, and the past migration flows on trade are all substantially reduced, indicating that they 
affect current trade via past trade. Distance matters for trade through its affect on both current 
and past trade, as controlling for trade in 1965 truncates the impact by a third. The same is true 
for log migration, which gets cut in half and becomes no longer significant. In all, this regression 
is direct evidence for the version of dynamic gravity offered versus alternative explanations, such 
as a static gravity equation Heckscher-Ohlin theory of factor endowments explaining the 
remarkable persistence of trade.  
Colonization only matters for trade today to the extent that colonization affected trade 
flows in 1965. This is how "dynamic gravity" is a partial answer to the "Distance Puzzle," as for 
variables such as past migration and colonization, the "past relative trade cost" term are actually 
still increasing for many former colonial pairs. How could this be? When British people first 
settled in countries such as Australia and New Zealand, the historical trade costs and cultural 
differences between these Australasian countries and the homeland was nil (up until the 
migration), so contemporaneous trade costs were the only thing that would have dampened trade. 
Over time, those trade costs would begin to affect tastes and production (i.e., they become "past 
trade costs"), remote Australasian culture (including language) started to diverge from the 
mother country, and the old trade networks weakened, even as actual trade costs were falling.  
  In the second column of Table 4 below, the regression model in equation (3.1) is 
implemented with Regional Two-Way clustered standard errors reported. Hence, if the theory is 
correct, we should also see that lagged domestic GDP is negatively correlated with current trade 
flows. Interestingly, however, the coefficient on lagged domestic GDP in this specification is not 
significant, despite the fact that our theory predicted that lagged trade and lagged GDP should 
enter symmetrically. If we drop the Linder term -- the log of the absolute difference in real GDP 
per capita -- and the real GDP per capita terms, then lagged GDP will be significant and 
negative, but the magnitude will still only be significantly less than the coefficient of log trade 
(see appendix for this version and other robustness checks). Since there is significant correlation 
27 
between a country's GDP in 2005 and 1965, this implies that, other things equal, trade will be 
higher today for country pairs which had larger GDPs in 1965, traded more in 1965, and had 
smaller differences in per capita GDP in 1965.  
 
 
Table 4: Dynamic Gravity 
Two-Way Geographic Clusters, Dependent Variable: Log Bilateral Trade, 2005 
Log Bilateral   0.608* 
Trade, 1965 (0.11) 
Log Domestic  1.303* 0.976* 
GDP, 2005 (0.13) (0.22) 
Log Domestic -0.038 
GDP, 1965 (0.09) 
Linder -0.292** -0.221+ 
(0.14) (0.12) 
Log per capita   0.479* 0.300** 
Real GDP (0.16) (0.12) 
Log Weighted Distance -2.279* -1.643* 
(0.21) (0.20) 
Common Language  0.435** 0.463* 
Dummy (0.18) (0.13) 
Landlocked Dummy -0.914* -0.847* 
(0.25) (0.18) 
Island Dummy 0.750** 0.339 
(0.34) (0.35) 
Sum of % of Population -1.149* -0.583+ 
100 km from Coast (0.377) (0.34) 
Log Mean Elevation -0.508* -0.268+ 
(0.13) (0.14) 
Common Colonizer  0.942** 0.478 
Dummy (0.44) (0.33) 
Colony Dummy 1.372* -0.213 
(0.42) (0.44) 
Log Migration 0.340** 0.199+ 
(0.16) (0.12) 
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  Observations     2301   2301 
  
Two-Way Geographic Cluster-Robust Standard errors in parentheses. Countries are the unit of cluster 
crossed with regions, so the US has separate clusters with 11 different regions of the world. Trade  
data come from the IMF's IFS, GDP from the WB, Log Migration from Putterman, the geography   
variables come from CEPII and the colonial variables have been adapted from Rose. The 72 country    
 sample is very full, as less than 10% of the data is missing. Dropping some of the poorer countries 
in order to balance the data set perfectly only reduces the significance of the Linder term (see the  
Unpublished Appendix for this version and for the summary statistics). Seven percent of the trade 
observations are zeros.31 +significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%. 
 
 
III.C: Long-Run Historical Evidence using Dynamic Gravity 
 
In the historical data in Regression Table 5 below, where the dependent variable is log 
bilateral trade in 2000, the coefficients on the geographic variables slightly shrink and lose 
significance once log bilateral trade in 1870 is included as a control.32 As more recent years of 
trade are included as regressors, the coefficient on distance becomes insignificant at the 99% 
confidence level. I would speculate that the reason that the geographic coefficients' size and 
significance do not drop even more quickly due to the inclusion of more recent lagged values of 
trade is regional trade liberalization, and perhaps that differentiated-product trade now accounts 
                                                 
31
 I have added one to avoid taking the log of zero. Given that a relatively small percentage of the trade observations 
are zeros, there is scant benefit to doing Tobit in levels, while using a Poisson Psuedo-Maximum Liklihood 
estimator to estimate gravity equations has been shown to yield biased estimates. These other various models, 
including simply limiting the sample to positive trade values and the Heckman selection model suggested in gravity 
estimation by de Groot and Linders (2006) -- who argue that gravity should not be done in Tobit -- are dealt with in 
the Unpublished Appendix. In the debate about what to do with the zeros it is often lost that with perfect trade data, 
there would unlikely be any true zeros. This is because, even though there is zero reported trade between, say 
Vietnam and Bolivia, both nations trade a lot with the United States and with Peru, so it is likely that a small fraction 
of what Vietnam exports to either the US or Peru ends up in Bolivia. In this case, adding one to zero trade values 
would be reducing bias due to imperfect data instead of introducing it.  
32
 And none of the coefficients of interest are altered much when lagged log domestic GDP is added, to save space 
this version is included in the Unpublished Appendix. Although there is missing data, with the larger post-war data, 
there was no benefit to throwing out lots of useful and interesting data in the interest of perfectly balancing the 
sample, so this is at most a very minor issue. Also, given the geographic diversity of the smaller sample, there is 
little reason to cluster. Interestingly, doing a two-way cluster on column II actually reduces the standard errors, as 
the within cluster correlation is actually negative.  
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for a larger proportion of total long-distance trade and is more affected by tastes and culture, 
counteracting the effect of declining transportation costs. Increased trade in 1870 leads to higher 
trade in 2000, even controlling for other standard gravity arguments. This implies that lagged 
trade costs -- history -- is itself a key determinant of trade today, and thus is a probable 
determinant of the wealth of nations. 
 
Regression Table 5: Dependent Variable Log Trade, Year 2000 
Regression:  I II III IV V 
Log Domestic GDP 2000 1.329* 1.257* 1.128* 0.862* 0.392* 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06) 
Log Trade 1870 0.097** 
(0.04) 
Log Trade 1913 0.160* 
(0.04) 
Log Trade 1960 0.480* 
(0.05) 
Log Trade 1980 0.782* 
(0.04) 
Log Distance -1.554* -1.476* -1.288* -0.903* -0.283** 
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.19) (0.13) 
Border 1.600* 1.293** 1.315** 0.925** 0.384 
(0.57) (0.59) (0.56) (0.46) (0.30) 
Island 0.589** 0.201 0.092 -0.39 -0.183 
(0.29) (0.35) (0.31) (0.25) (0.15) 
Europe 0.902 0.952 0.95 0.939** 0.454 
(0.51) (0.51) (0.49) (0.40) (0.26) 
Observations 149 130 147 149 149 
R-squared 0.747 0.75 0.753 0.841 0.935 
Standard errors in parentheses; 26 country sample from Jacks, Meissner, Novy (2008) 
+ significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
 
IV. Conclusion and Further Research 
 
Does taking a dynamic specification versus a static specification matter for gravity estimation? 
In a companion paper, I apply the dynamic gravity specification to the estimate of currency 
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unions on trade and show that, in practice, the dynamic specification can yield dramatically 
different results.  
 In this paper, there was also no space to work out the political economy ramifications. 
One mystery of the political economy of trade is that even though the advantages of trading are 
clear, opposition to trade has a long history, and is still widespread. While the Stolper-Samuelson 
Theorem tells us that factors used relatively less abundantly will lose from trade, in this model, 
since trade necessarily influences culture, a second group of people might also lose out from 
trade: xenophobic cultural conservatives. Indeed, the original rationale for trade protectionism 
(as well as its inward-looking foreign policy) in the United States appears to owe as much to 
nativism as it did to any broad factor, such as labor, losing out, or due to any well-thought-out, 
Hamiltonian industrial policy. It is also difficult to ignore the fact that the first era of 
globalization ended with two vigorous world wars centered around identity politics.  
 New Trade Theory and the New Economic Geography emphasize that real wages are a 
function of the size of market and of market access -- e.g., Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 
(1999), Redding and Venables (2000), and Davis and Weinstein (1999, 2003) -- an insight which 
dates back at least as far as Harris (1954). An implication of this model is that having extensive 
cultural barriers to large markets depresses real wages.33 Hence, this model implies that part of 
the reason that Africa is still poor today is that in the past, transport costs to the inland areas of 
the continent were exorbitantly high due to the disease environment and the lack of transport 
infrastructure or navigable rivers or inlets. The evidence in Table 5 above suggests that to the 
extent that these factors adversely affected African trade in 1870, they adversely affect trade 
today as well. 
 Although pure shipping costs are probably no longer a critical determinate of inter-
regional wage differentials in the United States, the model predicts that real wages in the US 
north should still be higher than in the US south due to the effects of lagged values of transport 
costs on learning-by-doing. This model has the potential to explain why the key economic 
centers of the world are predominantly coastal and river regions (Sachs 1999). In the photograph 
                                                 
33
 This is fairly intuitive from the form of the dynamic gravity equation, but a simple look at the unit cost function 
for the consumer model or the unit revenue function from the producer model shows this clearly -- these are in the 
Appendix. 
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of the Earth at night in the Unpublished Appendix, it is immediately clear that the areas of the 
world which are lit up, even today, are those areas which appear to have low transport costs to 
large markets -- river and coastal regions being especially bright. History, via culture, is very 
much a critical determinant of trade. And the reverse is also true.  
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
I. Derivation of Dynamic Gravity 
 
To derive the gravity equation in Section II, first start with equation (1.3)  
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(A.1), where I have simply re-arranged terms. Now, 
following Novy (2008), equation (1.3) must hold for all i and j, so that ( )
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= (A.4), after normalizing 
within-country trade costs to one and assuming trade costs are symmetric -- an assumption made 
merely to simplify the expression, and which could easily be relaxed. From (A.4), it is 
straightforward to make the substitution 
1
( 1)ijt ij ts
σ ρβ −
−
≡
repeatedly, and take the log to arrive at 
(1.5). In section II, equations (2.2) and (2.3) are derived in precisely the same way.  
 The unit cost function for the consumer model is:  
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 The unit cost function indicates how cheaply one can derive one unit of utility. It can be 
easily seen that the cost of one unit of utility increases with trade costs, and also increases with 
cultural diversity. The interesting implication is that it is bad, in this model, to be different. The 
betas depend upon past trade costs, so that past trade costs make it more expensive to consume a 
unit of utility today. The unit revenue function from the producer model carries the same 
implication.  
II. Data Appendix 
 
To ensure that this remarkable stability in trade patterns is not merely a product of having 
a narrow data set, I have repeated the exercise below in Table II using a much larger postwar 
sample from the IMF's Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS). Trade in the larger IMF sample 
from 1955 and 1969 to 2000 is even more persistent with the larger IMF data set. To put the 
relative sizes of the R-squared from regressing the log of the product of lagged bilateral trade on 
log bilateral trade in 2000 in perspective, comparing Column V to Column I of Table II, trade in 
1955 is a better predictor of trade for year 2000 than GDP in 2000.  
 
 
Appendix Table 1: Dependent Variable, Log Trade 2000 
  I II III IV   V 
Regressor: Log Trade in 1955 1969 1980 1995 vs.  Log GDP 2000 
Coefficient 1.292* 1.221* 0.947* 0.992* 0.837* 
(Std. Error) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Observations 2852 6415 7478 9425 5340 
R-squared 0.597 0.692 0.775 0.93 0.499 
Corr. with trade in 2000 0.76 0.84 0.88 0.97   0.58 
 * significant at 1%; Trade data from IMF DOTS, GDP from the World Bank.  
 
 In Appendix Table 2, I have included the correlation coefficients for the log product of 
bilateral trade over GDP for every decade going back to 1870. Interestingly, trade flows today 
are much more stable than they have ever been.  
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Appendix Table 2: Correlation Coefficient Matrix of the Log of Bilateral Trade over GDP 
  2000 1995 1980 1969 1955 1928 1910 1890 1870 
2000 1 
1995 .99 1 
1980 .95 .96 1 
1969 .88 .90 .96 1 
1955 .70 .72 .80 .87 1 
1928 .59 .60 .65 .70 .82 1 
1910 .53 .54 .58 .61 .72 .87 1 
1890 .54 .55 .61 .63 .69 .71 .85 1 
1870 .45 .45 .52 .56 .60 .59 .76 .82 1 
Sample of 26 countries trade from Jacks, Meissner, Novy (2008); pre WWI gdp data are rough 
estimates from Maddison. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 3: Investigating Various Clustering Strategies 
          
Robust FGLS One-Way Two-Way  
Clusters Clusters 
          
Log of Bilateral Domestic GDP 1.303* 
(0.027) (0.025) (0.10) 
(8 Regional Clusters) (0.071) (0.096) 
(11 Regional Clusters) (0.068) (0.127) 
(13 Regional Clusters) (0.060) (0.109) 
Linder: Log Difference -0.292* 
in GDP per capita (0.038) (0.038) (0.09) 
(8 Regional Clusters) (0.103) (0.096) 
(11 Regional Clusters) (0.102) (0.138) 
(13 Regional Clusters) (0.094) (0.138) 
Common Language Dummy 0.435* 
(0.122) (0.121) (0.27) 
(8 Regional Clusters) (0.218) (0.213) 
(11 Regional Clusters) (0.238) (0.182) 
(13 Regional Clusters) (0.238) (0.190) 
Colonial Dummy 1.372* 
(0.331) (0.343) (0.34) 
(8 Regional Clusters) (0.342) (0.322) 
(11 Regional Clusters) (0.309) (0.418) 
34 
(13 Regional Clusters) (0.316) (0.436) 
Log Migration 0.340* 
(0.080) (0.097) (0.11) 
(8 Regional Clusters) (0.103) (0.115) 
(11 Regional Clusters) (0.116) (0.158) 
(13 Regional Clusters) (0.111) (0.142) 
          
  Observations: 2301, R-squared = .811; This is the same regression as reported in Table 4, only with  
various SEs reported, and some results suppressed to save space (such as GDP per capita, the Island,  
Common Colonizer, and Landlocked Dummies). See Unpublished Appendix for more complete results.  
 In the column "Two-Way Clusters" the first errors reported are just "normal" two-way clusters of the  
variety found in Cameron et. al., where one dimension of the cluster is each of the first country in each  
dyadic pair and all of its trading partners, while for the Regional clusters, the first country's trade with 
each of its trading partners is broken up into eight regional clusters -- e.g., South America, Europe,    
North America. The "one-way" clusters create a single cluster for each possible trade combination 
among the regions of the world, for example, all North American trade with South America enters into a 
single cluster, and all South American trade with other South American countries are in a separate 
cluster. The Migration data comes from Putterman, the GDP data come from the World Bank, the trade 
data comes from the IMF, the colonial data from Rose, and the geographic data come from CEPII.  
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